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SALAZAR V. BUONO: THE CROSS BETWEEN 
ENDORSEMENT AND HISTORY 
Mary Jean Dolan* 
The striking image of a white cross on stark rock, silhouetted against 
the desert sky,1 now symbolizes not only Christianity and, arguably, World 
War I military sacrifice, but also the equally dramatic, prolonged saga of the 
Salazar v. Buono litigation.  The photos invoke the most recent Supreme 
Court battle in the legal and cultural war to define religion‘s role in the pub-
lic square.  Competing approaches stress either preserving history or avoid-
ing government endorsement of religion; this brief article analyzes a 
potential new synthesis suggested by Buono. 
The original cross war memorial was erected in 1934 by a local group 
of WWI veterans in the Mojave Desert,2 an isolated area of federally-owned 
land which, 60 years later, became a National Preserve.3  When Frank Buo-
no brought an Establishment Clause suit over the display of the large cross 
on federal land, the district court held that it conveyed the appearance of a 
government endorsement of Christianity, and thus enjoined its display.4  
While the decision was pending before the district court, and in the after-
math of 9/11, Congress designated the cross a National Memorial.5  Next, 
rather than remove the cross, while the first Ninth Circuit appeal was pend-
ing, Congress passed a land swap bill to transfer the underlying property to 
the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), so long as the property continued to 
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1
  For images, see, e.g., http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2008/10/good-morning-15.html 
(link). 
2
  See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010) (Buono) (link). 
3
  California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, § 501, 108 Stat. 4471, 4889–90. 
4
  Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1203–04, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Buono I), aff’d 371 F.3d 
543 (9th Cir. 2004) (Buono II). 
5
  See Act of Jan. 10, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, §§ 8137(a), 8137(c), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79; see 
also Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 770 (9th Cir. 2008) (Buono IV) (discussing the designation). 
6
  See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121(a)–(b), (e), 
117 Stat. 1054, 1100; see also Buono II, 371 F.3d at 545 (indicating that the act providing for the land 
transfer was passed after oral argument before the Ninth Circuit, while decision was still pending). 
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the issue of whether the land transfer would itself be constitutional or cure 
the Establishment Clause violation.7  When Buono returned to the district 
court to stop the land transfer, that court found Congress‘s strategy to be an 
invalid attempt to circumvent the 2002 injunction and permanently enjoined 
the land transfer (the ―2005 injunction‖).8  The Ninth Circuit again af-
firmed.9 
After sorting out the procedural morass, the issue before the Supreme 
Court technically was the validity of the 2005 injunction.10  According to 
the plurality, this turned on whether the land transfer could cure the Estab-
lishment Clause violation previously adjudicated in 2002.11  In a wildly 
splintered decision, five Justices suggested strongly that VFW ownership of 
the land would resolve Buono‘s original complaint,12 but the Court re-
manded the case to the district court, leaving the final outcome somewhat 
unsettled.13  Of interest here is the Court‘s emphasis on government efforts 
to ―avoid[] the disturbing symbolism associated with the destruction of the 
historic monument,‖ while also addressing the endorsement problem.14 
Since the Court‘s decision, a startling vigilante two-step, complete with 
a theft in the night, has intensified emotions and disrupted the balancing act.  
Less than two weeks after the Supreme Court‘s decision, the cross was sto-





  See Buono II, 371 F.3d at 546, 550. 
8
  Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181–82 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (Buono III), aff’d sub. nom., 
Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (Buono IV), rev’d sub. nom., Salazar v. Buono, 130 
S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (Buono). 
9
  Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 783. 
10
  See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1814–16 (2010) (Buono). 
11
  Id. at 1815–17. 
12
  See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1816–18 (plurality opinion); id. at 1821–24 (Alito, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (expressing the belief that the land transfer ended the controversy and 
that remand was, therefore, unnecessary); id. at 1825–26 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (finding 
that the land transfer changed the contours of the case to such an extent that Buono needed to reestablish 
standing). 
13
  Id. at 1821 (plurality opinion).  For a discussion of the unsettled issues, see After Supreme Court 
Decision, ACLU Will Continue To Argue That Mojave Cross Land Transfer To Veterans Group Does 
Not Remedy Establishment Clause Violation, ACLU.ORG (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/religion-
belief/after-supreme-court-decision-aclu-will-continue-argue-mojave-cross-land-transfer-vet (―[W]e‘re 
encouraged that the case is not over,‖ stated Peter Eliasberg, the ACLU attorney who argued the case.) 
(link). 
14
  Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1823 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see 
also id. at 1817 (plurality opinion) (―The 2002 injunction thus presented the Government with a dilem-
ma.  It could not . . . remove the cross without conveying disrespect for those the cross was seen as ho-
noring.‖). 
15
  Caroline Black, Mojave Cross Honoring U.S. War Dead Stolen in Middle of the Night, 
CBSNEWS.COM (May 12, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20004719-504083.html 
(link). 
16
  See id. 
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a substantial reward,17 and a newspaper published an anonymous letter from 
the alleged thief, which claimed that he was a veteran and that he stole the 
cross to defend the Constitution.18  Worse yet, one week later, a replacement 
metal cross was erected, also anonymously.19  After years of covering up the 
cross in a plywood box pending appeals, the National Park Service (NPS) 
physically removed the new metal cross from Sunrise Rock20—thus engag-
ing in the very symbolic act which first Congress, and then the Court, en-
deavored to avoid. 
These bizarre, post-decision news flashes create a surreal backdrop for 
analyzing the decision‘s focus on averting destruction of a historic war 
memorial.  But despite the apparent ease of removing and erecting this par-
ticular cross monument, this is a recurring ―dilemma‖ for the government.21  
Many longstanding war memorials and public monuments include some re-
ligious imagery; few are so easily removed.  More commonly, their scale 
and construction materials would require jackhammers and a demolition 
crew for removal.22 
This Article explores whether, and in what sense, the Court‘s Estab-
lishment Clause analysis is likely to continue focusing on context and social 
meaning, using a recognizable endorsement test or otherwise.  With six 
separate opinions, the Supreme Court‘s Salazar v. Buono decision was un-
usually splintered, even for an Establishment Clause decision.  Given that 
much of the discussion involved procedural issues of standing, injunctive 
relief, and res judicata, only three of the opinions wrestled with the merits: 
Justice Kennedy‘s plurality opinion; Justice Alito‘s concurrence in the 






  Liberty Institute, Mojave War Memorial Torn Down by Vandals!, LIBERTYINSTITUTE.ORG, 
http://www.libertyinstitute.org/current_cases.php?category=6&article=67 (announcing the Liberty Insti-
tute‘s $125,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the perpetrators) (link). 
18
  See Anonymous Letter Explaining Cross Theft Sent to Desert Dispatch, DESERTDISPATCH.COM 
(May 11, 2010), http://www.desertdispatch.com/articles/explaining-8465-anonymous-letter.html (link). 
19
  See Replica Cross Mysteriously Appears in Mojave: Authorities Call it Illegal and Remove it 
from Federal Preserve, MSNBC.COM (May 20, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37261550 (link). 
20
  See id.; Park Service Removes Mojave Cross Replica, CBN.COM (May 21, 2010), 
http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2010/May/Stolen-Mojave-Desert-Cross-Returned/ (link); see also Li-
berty Institute, Put the Cross Back!, http://www.putthecrossback.com/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2010) (soli-
citing support for a letter campaign to President Obama asking him to put the Mojave Desert Cross back 
up) (link). 
21
  Cf. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817 (2010) (Buono) (stating that the government was 
confronted with a ―dilemma‖ because it could not remove the cross without conveying disrespect). 
22
  For example, the Mt. Soledad Cross War Memorial involved in Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 
F. Supp. 2d 1199 (S.D. Cal. 2008), includes a large concrete cross and six granite walls with memorial 
plaques and has been standing since 1954 when it was first dedicated, id. at 1202–04. 
23
  See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811, 1816–21; id. at 1821–24 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment); id. at 1831–45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justices Scalia and Breyer, on the other 
hand, discussed solely procedural aspects of the case.  See id. at 1824–26 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (concluding that Buono lacked standing because an injunction to prevent the land transfer 
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What makes the first two opinions interesting is the interplay between 
the endorsement test and the usually competing historical approach.  To 
some extent, of course, the Court was saddled with considering the impact 
of the endorsement test because the district court had used it.24  Once the 
Court agreed that the 2002 judgment in Buono I had res judicata effect,25 the 
Justices had to confront whether, after the congressionally mandated trans-
fer, the cross would still convey government endorsement of religion be-
cause of its National Memorial status, tangled history, and intertwined roles 
as both a symbol of Christianity and one of WWI military sacrifice.  Con-
strained by this procedural straitjacket, the majority could not simply dec-
lare that the Establishment Clause permits the government to use Christian 
crosses to memorialize U.S. wars because that is ―our tradition[].‖26 
Instead, Justice Alito‘s concurrence and, to a lesser extent, Justice 
Kennedy‘s opinion, made two new, linked, rhetorical moves.  Both sug-
gested that a government‘s efforts to preserve a religious symbol with a 
specific, secular, historical meaning—at least one involving military sacri-
fice—is unlikely to be viewed as a government endorsement of religion.  
And both implied that, when calculating a monument‘s overall effect, the 
Court should consider how the ―reasonable observer‖ would interpret a 
forced removal.  Salazar v. Buono thus raises the question of just how far 
the endorsement test can be stretched before it loses all value for those who 
prefer it to an undiluted historical approach. 
This Article first briefly reviews the key features of the competing doc-
trines, and then analyzes these two Buono opinions for hints of Justices 
Kennedy‘s and Alito‘s views and the endorsement test‘s potential resilien-
cy.  It is possible to interpret these opinions as describing an expanded en-
dorsement test, one which takes the ―reasonable observer‖ one step further 
along an imagined ―endorsement test continuum.‖  The goal of this Article 
is to investigate options, given scholars‘ predictions that the Roberts Court 
is likely to reject altogether the viewer-centered endorsement test and adopt 
the moribund historical approach.27  I conclude by looking at whether this 
                                                                                                                           
was new relief); id. at 1842–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the ―law of injunctions‖ applied, not 
the Establishment Clause, and finding that the Court should have deferred to the district court‘s interpre-
tation of the scope of its injunction). 
24
  See Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1214–15 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Buono I) (applying the 
effect prong of the Lemon test and ―ask[ing] whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the 
practice . . . in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval [of religion]‖ (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring))). 
25
  See Buono,130 S.Ct. at 1815 (plurality opinion). 
26
  Cf. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)) (contemplating 
a role for tradition in the Establishment Clause analysis) (link). 
27
  See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 1–4 
(2006) (predicting that Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts will complete the transformation of the 
Establishment Clause from a doctrine protective of the separation of church and state to one that permits 
government endorsement of at least the majority religions); see also 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION 
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perspective on the Kennedy and Alito Buono opinions can be reconciled 
with the endorsement test‘s equality rationale. 
I. IRRECONCILABLE APPROACHES? 
In the Court‘s prior religious display cases, the viewer-centered en-
dorsement inquiry was proffered as a more sensitive antidote to the fixed, 
nativist historical approach.  The plurality opinions upholding both the 
crèche in Lynch v. Donnelly and the Ten Commandments monument in Van 
Orden v. Perry relied on the government‘s ―unbroken history‖ of petition-
ing God and acknowledging the role of Biblical religion in the Nation‘s 
public life.28  This reductive historical approach is intrinsically indifferent to 
the impact of such displays on observers and outsiders.  Rather, the judicial 
focus is on government‘s prior acts.  These opinions convey the idea that 
past practice almost inexorably defines current constitutionality.  For exam-
ple, the Lynch plurality stressed the ―countless . . . illustrations of . . . go-
vernmental sponsorship‖ of symbols of ―our religious heritage,‖29 and the 
government‘s prerogative to display depictions of ―a significant historical 
religious event long celebrated in the Western World.‖30  The plurality‘s ra-
tionale, it seems, might just as easily support the government‘s right to dis-
play a crucifix as part of a community‘s Easter holiday display.  As 
Professor Kent Greenawalt has cautioned, ―[f]or the principle that bars gov-
ernment promotion of religion to have significance, it cannot be evaded by 
turning every presentation of the dominant religion into a paean of faithful-
ness to the country‘s traditions.‖31 
In contrast, Justice O‘Connor‘s endorsement test famously asks wheth-
er a ―reasonable observer‖ would perceive the challenged symbol as con-
veying a message of governmental endorsement of religion.32  The 
appearance of such endorsement is unconstitutional, she asserted, because it 
communicates to non-adherents that they are political outsiders and to adhe-
rents that they are favored insiders.33  Interpreting a symbol‘s social mean-
ing starts with its visible surroundings.  This was the focus of the 
                                                                                                                           
AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 87 (2008) (―With [Justice O‘Connor‘s] re-
tirement, the fate of the endorsement test is uncertain.‖) (link). 
28
  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681, 686–88 (2005) (link); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670–71, 674–
78, 685.  The apex of the historical approach is Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (link), which 
held that the Establishment Clause allows each legislative session to begin with a prayer by a State-paid 
chaplain based on a tradition dating back to the First Amendment‘s enactment, id. at 784–85, 788–91. 
29
  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677 (emphasis added). 
30
  Id. at 680; see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690 (plurality opinion) (proclaiming that ―[t]hese dis-
plays and recognitions of the Ten Commandments bespeak the rich American tradition of religious ac-
knowledgments‖). 
31
  2 GREENAWALT, supra note 27, at 72. 
32
  See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595–97, 620 (1989) (adopting the test first proposed by 
Justice O‘Connor in her concurrence in Lynch) (link); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690–94 (O‘Connor, J., concur-
ring). 
33
  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688. 
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endorsement test in the Court‘s holiday display cases: a crèche was accept-
able if outdoors, surrounded by Santa and snowmen, but unconstitutional if 
displayed alone inside the courthouse.34  Similarly, to assert impermissible 
endorsement in Van Orden, the dissenters emphasized readily apparent con-
textual details—the Ten Commandments‘ location between the State Capi-
tol and Supreme Court and the distance and incoherence of allegedly 
surrounding statues.35 
In the next step along the endorsement test continuum, the endorse-
ment test‘s ―reasonable observer‖ also is deemed knowledgeable about the 
circumstances of a challenged symbol‘s installation and display.  While 
both the propriety and the scope of this consideration still are debated, the 
Court‘s application of the endorsement test has not turned on the views of 
the ―casual passerby‖ or ―isolated nonadherents.‖36  For example, in Van 
Orden, Justice Breyer‘s controlling concurrence not only noted the visible 
donor plaque, but also attributed to the reasonable observer the knowledge 
that the Fraternal Order of Eagles‘ donation of this Ten Commandments 
monument four decades earlier was part of its nationwide campaign against 
juvenile delinquency.37 
Up to this point, though, the endorsement test has not required omnis-
cience—or asked the hypothetical viewer to consider the social meaning of 
removing a challenged religious symbol.  When Justice Breyer explained 
that his decision in Van Orden was focused primarily on avoiding ―reli-
giously based divisiveness‖ over ―the removal of longstanding depictions of 
the Ten Commandments from public buildings across the Nation,‖ he did so 





  See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598–602, 613–21 (applying Justice O‘Connor‘s endorsement test to 
hold unconstitutional a crèche standing alone on the county courthouse steps, while finding permissible 
an outdoor menorah, placed next to a Christmas tree and generic holiday sign in front of a county build-
ing); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679–83 (plurality opinion). 
35
  Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 742–43 (Souter, J., dissenting) (Characterizing the ―17 monuments with 
no common appearance, history, or esthetic role scattered over 22 acres‖ as a collection ―does nothing to 
blunt the religious message and manifestly religious purpose behind it.‖). 
36
  See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995) (O‘Connor, J., 
concurring) (link).  Such knowledge has been attributed to the reasonable observer at least since Pinette, 
if not before.  In Pinette, Justice O‘Connor, whose views prevailed, clarified that the reasonable observ-
er is not ―the casual passerby‖ or ―isolated nonadherents,‖ but a hypothetical observer who is ―deemed 
aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears.‖  
Id. at 779–80.  Justice Stevens‘ dissent, on the other hand, argued that the endorsement test‘s ―reasona-
ble observer‖ should employ the perceptions of passersby with no special knowledge of context.  See id. 
at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  For a discussion on commentators‘ criticisms of the Court for failing to 
adopt the perspective of the ―reasonable nonadherent‖ when applying the endorsement test, see, for ex-
ample, B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement 
Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 532–33 (2005) (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW §§14–15, at 1296 (2d ed. 1988)) (link). 
37
  Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700–02. 
38
  Id. at 702–04 (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining that even if the contextual factors, including the 
Eagles‘ role, provide a ―strong, but not conclusive, indication that the Commandments‘ text conveys a 
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Next, this Article explores whether Salazar v. Buono thus suggested an ex-
panded endorsement test. 
II. THE ―REASONABLE OBSERVER‖ AND PRESERVING (ARGUABLY) 
HISTORIC WAR MEMORIALS 
One reading of the opinions by Justices Kennedy and Alito in Buono 
shows a new, potentially significant move: the creation of an exceedingly 
reasonable observer, one who considers the other side‘s perspective on a 
challenged religious symbol. 
Justice Alito‘s concurrence provides the clearer picture of this hybrid 
analysis.  The land transfer would satisfy the endorsement test, he con-
cluded, in part because ―a well-informed observer would appreciate that the 
transfer represents an effort by Congress to address a unique situation and 
to find a solution that best accommodates conflicting concerns.‖39  He 
stressed concerns about the messages that would be conveyed not by the 
unconstitutional display of a cross on government land, but by its forced 
removal after seventy years on Sunrise Rock: ―[T]his removal would have 
been viewed by many as a sign of disrespect for the brave soldiers whom 
the cross was meant to honor . . . [and] interpreted by some as an arresting 
symbol of a Government that is not neutral but hostile on matters of religion 
. . . .‖40  And the solution—the land transfer—was ―designed to eliminate 
any perception of religious sponsorship stemming from the location of the 
cross on federally owned land, while at the same time avoiding the disturb-
ing symbolism associated with the destruction of the historic monument.‖41 
Kennedy‘s opinion for the Court made the same points, though in a 
more oblique fashion.  According to Justice Kennedy, the district court 
erred because it failed to consider that a reasonable observer, knowing of 
the land transfer to the VFW, would no longer perceive any governmental 
endorsement of religion.42  Justice Kennedy invalidated the 2005 injunction 
based on his belief that it was erroneously grounded in a suspicion that 
Congress had acted with an illicit, evasive purpose.43  In a somewhat con-
fusing twist, Justice Kennedy nonetheless advised that, when considering 
the message the cross conveys to a reasonable observer, the relevant factors 
should include Congress‘ ―policy of accommodation.‖44  According to Ken-
nedy, the policy in this case was embodied in the land-transfer statute which 
Congress enacted when the 2002 injunction ―presented the Government 
                                                                                                                           
predominately secular message,‖ avoiding disputes over removals was ―a further factor . . . determina-
tive here‖). 
39
  Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1824 (2010) (Buono) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). 
40
  Id. at 1822–23. 
41
  Id. at 1823. 
42
  See id. at 1816–19 (plurality opinion). 
43
  See id. at 1816–20. 
44
  Id. at 1818, 1820. 
105: 42 (2010) Endorsement and History 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/21/ 49 
with a dilemma‖; the federal government was required to remove the cross 
war memorial, but ―it could not [do so] without conveying disrespect for 
those the cross was seen as honoring.‖45  Finally, he noted that if the land 
transfer is ―an insufficient accommodation,‖ the Court should consider 
whether signs disclosing VFW‘s land ownership would fully remedy the 
perception of government endorsement.46  Putting it all together, it appears 
that Justices Kennedy and Alito have added a new contextual factor to the 
reasonable observer‘s responsibilities.  While not fully articulated, the idea 
in Buono seems to be this: if a viewer knows that the reason for the land 
transfer is to avoid tearing down a seventy-year-old symbol, first erected in 
1934 by WWI veterans and revered ever since as a war memorial honoring 
the sacrifices of the war dead, then that viewer will not perceive the trans-
fer, or the newly-privatized symbol, as a governmental endorsement of the 
Christian religion. 
This approach certainly is related to Justice Breyer‘s discussion of reli-
gious divisiveness in Van Orden, but there is a subtle difference.  In Van 
Orden, Breyer found that the endorsement test probably, but not conclu-
sively, favored allowing the Ten Commandments.47  There, his concern over 
future disputes, which derived from his exercise of ―legal judgment‖ and 
the Establishment Clause‘s purposes, served as the tipping point.48  In Buo-
no, however, the value of preserving longstanding monuments appears to be 
folded into the endorsement test, and that mythical character, the reasonable 
observer, appears to be charged with adopting this political concern as her 
own.  This expanded endorsement test seems to invert the central purpose 
of a test originally focused on protecting non-adherents, but often criticized 
as majoritarian in practice.49  The impact of this transformation, evaluated 
below, interconnects with observers‘ understandings of government mo-
tives, the level of contextual knowledge attributed to observers, and a gov-
ernment‘s corresponding responsibility, if any, to communicate essential 
information through disclaimers. 
III. SEVERAL VERSIONS OF THE USUAL FACTORS 
One‘s opinion of the outcome of the Buono case, of course, depends at 





  Id. at 1817. 
46
  See id. at 1820.  Note that here Kennedy uses the term ―accommodation‖ to refer to the concerns 
of non-adherents and the offended; these individuals are not the usual benefactors of the ―accommoda-
tionist‖ position. 
47
  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703–04 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
48
  See id. at 700.  For a discussion of the Establishment Clause‘s political/religious ―divisiveness‖ 
rationale see, for example, Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1667, 1681–1708 (2006). 
49
  See, e.g., Mark Strasser, The Protection and Alienation of Religious Minorities: On the Evolution 
of the Endorsement Test, 2008 MICH. STATE L. REV. 667 (link). 
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reasons for skepticism about Congress‘s motive for the land-transfer statute: 
NPS rejected a request to install a Buddhist stupa on Sunrise Rock, and 
took no action to address the cross display until that time;50 the cross, which 
had been replaced over the years, failed to qualify as a National Historic 
Landmark;51 and local residents hold an annual sunrise Easter service at the 
cross.52  Perhaps not surprisingly, the story considered by the lower courts 
and broadcast in the media was substantially different than the narrative 
told by the Supreme Court‘s majority opinion and, at times, the dissent. 
Looking first at the most widely-publicized perspective, the cross‘s un-
constitutionality, even after the land-transfer maneuver, seems inescapable.  
As the Ninth Circuit emphasized, ―carving out a tiny parcel of property in 
the midst of this vast Preserve—like a donut hole with the cross atop it—
will do nothing to minimize the impermissible governmental endorse-
ment.‖53  Congress‘ repeated attempts to block removal of the cross, par-
ticularly its designation of this sectarian symbol as the country‘s only WWI 
National Memorial, which placed it in an elite group with such icons as the 
Washington Monument, raises understandable concerns.54  Further, contem-
plate the lower courts‘ statutory interpretations: the federal government re-
tains full control of the land; it is required to fund and install a cross replica 
and plaque; and the land will revert back to the government if the VFW ev-
er removes the cross.55  It is hard to see how this scenario could pass consti-
tutional muster. 
The Court‘s factual assumptions, however, were far more benign.  
Most significantly, all the Justices assumed the cross‘s ―National Memori-
al‖ status had a potentially limited shelf-life.  Following the government 
lawyers‘ interpretation, their opinions agreed that, post-land transfer, the 
VFW has the legal authority to remove, modify, or supplement the cross, so 
long as it continues to use the land parcel to display some type of WWI 





  See Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 549 (9th Cir. 2004) (Buono II); Declaration of Mary Martin 
in Support of Defendants‘ Motion for Summary Judgment, Joint Appendix at 69, Buono, 130 S.Ct. 1803 
(No. 08-472) (explaining that ―[t]he NPS intended to remove the cross from public land following a 
written inquiry in 1999 by another individual about placing other religious symbols near the cross‖). 
51
  Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008) (Buono IV). 
52
  See id. 
53
  Id. at 783. 
54
  See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1841–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―As far as I can tell, however, it is un-
precedented in the Nation's history to designate a bare, unadorned cross as the national war memorial for 
a particular group of veterans.‖).  In addition, during the litigation, Congress twice enacted bills to pro-
hibit the use of federal funds to remove the cross memorial.  See Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 133, 114 Stat. 
2763, 2763A–230 (2000); Pub. L. No. 107-248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1519, 1551 (2002). 
55
  See Buono IV, 527 F.3d at 777. 
56
  Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (―Con-
gress did not prevent the VFW from supplementing the existing monument or replacing it with a war 
memorial of a different design.‖); id. at 1826 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that it is 
―merely speculative‖ to assert that the VFW will keep up the Cross because ―[n]othing in the statutes 
compels the VFW (or any future proprietor) to keep it up‖); id. at 1837 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating 
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Mojave Desert Preserve as riddled with private holdings57 (effectively trans-
forming the image to something closer to Swiss cheese), and the majority 
opinion went on to note the nearby private ranches.58  This brief Article 
works from the understandings expressed in the Court‘s opinions, particu-
larly its assumption that the VFW is required to maintain a WWI memori-
al—but not necessarily the cross—as a condition of keeping the transferred 
property.59  Also, while not mentioned in the opinions, Salazar v. Buono is 
unlike the Court‘s precedents where governments have failed the ―secular 
purpose‖ test.60  It lacked direct evidence of any ulterior government motive 
to promote Christianity over Buddhism, or to use the cross‘ history as a 
WWI war memorial as a ruse, or to proclaim a ―Christian Nation.‖ 
IV. GLIMPSES OF THE ENDORSEMENT TEST‘S FUTURE 
In the concluding section, this Article evaluates whether the ―expanded 
endorsement test‖ suggested by Kennedy‘s and Alito‘s Buono opinions 
could be any improvement over a retreat to the straight historical approach.  
Keeping an open mind for now, the next step is to review the two opinions 
for signs that either is open to any type of viewer-centered approach, once 
given a clean procedural slate. 
Any assertion that the endorsement test is not dead yet must confront 
the claim that it was effectively killed off in Pleasant Grove City v. Sum-
mum.61  The basis for this claim is a meandering passage in Summum in 
                                                                                                                           
that the land transfer statute ―does not categorically require the new owner of the property to display the 
existing memorial[,] . . . [although it] most certainly encourages this result‖). 
57
  Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472) (―[T]here are many, 
many private holdings within the preserve[;] people . . . could put up whatever religious symbols they 
wanted to.  One simply wouldn‘t know whether it was on private land or on other land.‖) (link). 
58
  Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811 (plurality opinion); see also Deposition of Frank Buono, Joint Appen-
dix at 79, Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472) (acknowledging he did not know initially whether the 
land under the cross was public or private). 
59
  Additional research of non-record facts indicates that neither of these judicial narratives fully de-
scribes the actual practice of National Memorial designations.  See Mary Jean Dolan, The Cross as Na-
tional Memorial, 21–35 (unpublished original legal research presented at the Law and Religion 
Roundtable on June 24, 2010 at Brooklyn Law School) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cross as Na-
tional Memorial].  For example, National Memorial status is not as lofty or rare as it would seem, the 
cross does not appear to be the sole WWI memorial for the nation, and abolishing National Memorial 
status frequently has entailed specific congressional action.  For an illustration of the seemingly random 
manner in which local statues have received this congressional designation, see, for example, the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 2877, 122 Stat. 3, 563–
64, which authorized the creation of a National War Dogs Monument, and National War Dogs Monu-
ment, Inc., http://www.nationalwardogsmonument.org/ (last visited June 12, 2010) (link). 
60
  See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850, 858 (2005) (finding officials‘ religious 
purposes to be evident from their posting of the first two Ten Commandments displays) (link); Wallace 
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 43 (1985) (reporting that the sponsor of a moment-of-silence bill testified that 
his purpose was to return prayer to the schools) (link). 
61
  See Scott W. Gaylord, Licensing Facially Religious Government Speech: Summum’s Impact on 
the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 315, 391–98 (2010) (arguing that, 
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which Justice Alito, writing for the Court, seemed to suggest in dicta that 
any monument could mean anything to anyone.62  Elsewhere, I have con-
tested that claim on two grounds.63  First, it is wholly inconsistent with the 
rationale of Summum.  Justice Alito‘s government-speech holding relied on 
both the reasonable viewer‘s perception, based on contextual clues, that the 
monuments conveyed some message on the government‘s behalf, and the 
government‘s intent to convey some recognizable theme.64  Second, else-
where in the Summum opinion, Justice Alito expressly recognized that there 
can be a shared social consensus on the meanings of specific monuments.65  
Thus, Summum left open the possibility that the Court would continue to re-
ly on observers‘ context-based interpretations. 
So, which spin on the controversial Summum passage was validated by 
Justice Alito‘s Buono concurrence?  Both reflect some truth.  On balance, 
though, there is still some ground to believe that the Court will continue to 
pay attention to the viewer‘s perceptions of government endorsement of re-
ligion.  The analysis here will start with Alito‘s Buono opinion, and then 
address Justice Kennedy‘s. 
While Justice Alito repeated in Buono that a monument may be ―‗in-
terpreted by different observers, in a variety of ways,‘‖66  this time he deli-
mited the phrase by use of examples of several plausible meanings, each 
shared by large, identifiable constituencies.  In Buono, he observed that 
those who saw the cross monument ―appear to have viewed it as conveying 
at least two significantly different messages,‖ both as the ―preeminent sym-
bol of Christianity‖ and as a WWI memorial.67  To say that a given symbol 
sends more than one message is not equivalent to saying that it conveys an 
                                                                                                                           
after Summum, the endorsement test no longer applies to government speech); see also Lisa Shaw Roy, 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: Monuments, Messages, and the Next Establishment Clause, 104 NW. 
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 280 (2010) (exploring inconsistencies between Justice Alito‘s Summum opinion 
and the endorsement test) (link).  See generally Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132–
34 (2009) (holding that donated monuments displayed in public parks are ―government speech‖) (link). 
62
  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133–37.  For commentary on Justice Alito‘s claim, see Steven G. Gey, 
Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the Government Has Nothing to 
Say?, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 50–51, 55), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1544635 (link). 
63
  See Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: Establishment Clause Limits Af-
ter Summum, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming Oct. 2010) (manuscript at 41–49), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1548761 [hereinafter Government Identity 
Speech] (link). 
64
  See, e.g., Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (explaining that the City‘s actions—―t[aking] ownership of 
[a] monument and put[ting] it on permanent display in a park that . . . is linked to the City‘s identity‖—
―unmistakably signif[ied] to all Park visitors that the City intend[ed] the monument to speak on its be-
half‖). 
65
  See, e.g., id. at 1136 (explaining that the Statue of Liberty came ―to be viewed as a beacon wel-
coming immigrants to a land of freedom‖). 
66
  Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1822 (2010) (Buono) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (quoting Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135). 
67
  Id. 
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infinite number of messages, and thus effectively none.  The endorsement 
test does not require a single possible message,68 just a decision about the 
relative strengths of possible messages and a normative vision of whose 
perceptions should govern in a particular cultural context. 
Other statements in Buono also weaken the claim that Justice Alito has 
rejected testing for social meaning.  For one, Justice Alito expressly recog-
nized that viewers can discern differences in meaning based on contextual 
details of location and the nature of the government‘s involvement.  Res-
ponding to a claim in Justice Stevens‘ dissent,69 Alito asserted that ―a rea-
sonable observer would not view the land exchange as the equivalent of the 
construction of an official World War I memorial on the National Mall.‖70  
Preserving the old is thus distinguishable from erecting the new.  An action 
taken to resolve conflict over an historical war memorial conveys quite a 
different message from the triumphalism that many would perceive if, as in 
this example, the federal government chose now to erect a Christian cross in 
the Nation‘s Capitol to represent all veterans. 
Also potentially relevant is Justice Alito‘s acknowledgement in Buono 
that, in a specific historical and cultural context, a symbol is likely to have a 
commonly-recognized meaning.  Noting that the original reason WWI vet-
erans installed the cross was ―to commemorate American war dead,‖71 he 
wrote, 
 
[P]articularly for those with searing memories of The Great 
War, the symbol that was selected, a plain unadorned white 
cross, no doubt evoked the unforgettable image of the white 
crosses, row on row, that marked the final resting places of 
so many American soldiers who fell in that conflict.72 
 
At the time the cross was erected in 1934, and for some time thereafter, 
its meaning as a WWI war memorial would have been more clearly evident 
to a larger percentage of viewers.  Thus, Alito‘s reasoning can be construed 
as acknowledging that social meaning varies by historical era.  But in order 





  See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of Petitioners at 30, 
Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472) (arguing that the Court should overrule the endorsement test be-
cause it is based on an outmoded ―single message assumption‖ that was rejected in Summum) (link).  But 
cf. Government Identity Speech, supra note 63, at 66–74 (disagreeing that the viability of the endorse-
ment test depends on the ―single message assumption‖). 
69
  See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1841–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
70
  Id. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
71
  Id. at 1822. 
72
  Id.; see also id. at 1820 (plurality opinion) (―It evokes thousands of small crosses in foreign fields 
marking the graves of Americans who fell in battles . . . .‖); cf. American Battle Monuments Commis-
sion, Cemeteries, http://www.abmc.gov/cemeteries/cemeteries.php (last visited Sep. 1, 2010) (showing 
lists and photos of overseas military cemeteries) (link). 
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meaning at the time it was erected, as I suggest below, its origins and pur-
pose must be disclosed.  Without such constraints, a broader reliance on 
―context‖ morphs into a veneration of tradition and swallows the endorse-
ment test altogether. 
Even the passage discussed above, in which Justice Alito explains the 
two messages that the cross‘s removal likely would convey, shows that rec-
ognition of viewers‘ perceptions remains significant and cognizable.  Con-
sistent with the endorsement test, much of Justice Alito‘s concurrence in 
Buono supports analyzing these types of Establishment Clause claims by 
parsing out the social meaning conveyed to a ―reasonable observer.‖  Still, 
given his simultaneous denigration of the ―so-called‖ endorsement test,73 
my prediction of his continued amenability to this approach is quite tenta-
tive. 
Turning to Justice Kennedy, his continued rejection of the endorsement 
test per se seems likely, but his statements in Buono leave room for contin-
ued analysis of context and social meaning.  He did not use Buono as an 
opportunity to announce any new categorical rules for the Establishment 
Clause or to eradicate the endorsement test.  Unlike the plurality opinion in 
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, for example, which as-
serted that private religious speech in a public forum can never violate the 
Establishment Clause, regardless of viewers‘ perceptions,74 none of the opi-
nions in Buono declared a similar absolute.  That may not count for much, 
though; as Kennedy noted, ―this case is ill suited for announcing categorical 
rules.‖75  Also, he suggested to the district court that, on remand, the en-
dorsement test may no longer be the appropriate framework because, ―[a]s 
a general matter, courts considering Establishment Clause challenges do 
not inquire into ‗reasonable observer‘ perceptions with respect to objects on 
private land.‖76 
At the same time, however, Justice Kennedy implied that the Court 
necessarily will continue using ―highly fact-specific‖ inquiries for these 
cases.77  Also, he included in Buono his paradigmatic example of a display 
that would exceed constitutional limits: if a city permitted ―an obtrusive 
year-round religious display,‖ such as ―the permanent erection of a large 





  See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
74
  515 U.S. 753, 757 (1995). 
75
  Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1820 (plurality opinion). 
76
  Id. at 1819 (emphasis added). 
77
  Id. at 1820. 
78
  Id. at 1816 (quoting Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989)).  Arguably, especially after 
Summum, Texas‘s Ten Commandments display—a large unmediated religious text, prominently dis-
played, standing alone, with its proclamations from God unavoidably read by those walking to the State 
Supreme Court and the State Capitol—is equivalent to Justice Kennedy‘s example.  See Brief for Peti-
tioner at 1–2, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (No. 03-1500) (link). 
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display ―coercion,‖79 in Buono, he used his city hall cross example to high-
light a difference in motives; the war memorial cross was erected by a local 
VFW post and intended to memorialize fallen soldiers,80 not installed by the 
government to display its approval. 
Justice Kennedy, of course, is well-known for his strong dissent in-
veighing against the endorsement test in Allegheny.81  His critique there ex-
pressed concern that a focus on the feelings of non-adherents would 
―invalidate scores of traditional practices recognizing the place religion 
holds in our culture.‖82  It may be that, twenty-one years after Allegheny and 
in light of the Buono reasoning, which imputes to the ―objective, hypotheti-
cal observer‖ knowledge of ―all the pertinent facts and circumstances,‖83 
that the endorsement test has been ―twisted and stretched‖84 sufficiently to 
placate Justice Kennedy.  His city hall cross example now seems to better 
serve the ―expanded endorsement test‖ described in Buono than his indirect 
coercion test, first invoked in Lee v. Weisman to prohibit high school grad-
uation prayers.85 
V. THE ―ENDORSEMENT CONTINUUM‖— ANY POTENTIAL VALUE 
ADDED? 
In another piece in this symposium, Professor Lisa Roy looks at Justic-
es Kennedy‘s and Alito‘s Buono opinions and asserts, quite reasonably, that 
they ―confirm the move from no-endorsement toward its opposite pole, ac-
commodation.‖86  While this conclusion may flow in part from an idealistic 
description of the endorsement test,87 it also targets a root concern that 
―without a reasonable observer who can discern a message of exclusion[,] 
the endorsement test loses much of its content.‖88 
This risk is real, as proved by the glaring omission from both Kenne-
dy‘s and Alito‘s Buono opinions of any noticeable attention to the percep-
tions of religious outsiders.  Supplementary considerations of the message 





  Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659–62 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
80
  Cf. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1816 (―Placement of the cross on Government-owned land was not an at-
tempt to set the imprimatur of the state on a particular creed.‖) 
81
  See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660–62 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
82
  See id. at 673–74. 
83
  Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819. 
84
  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 674. 
85
  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592–93, 599 (1992) (link). 
86
  See Lisa Shaw Roy, Salazar v. Buono: The Perils of Piecemeal Adjudication, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 72, 81 (2010), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/21/LRColl2010n21Dolan.pdf (link). 
87
  See id. at 80. 
88
  Id. at 81 (―Justice O‘Connor‘s endorsement test focuses on the message conveyed to a religious 
outsider‖).  For the view that the test as actually practiced never conformed to this focus, see Strasser, 
supra note 49. 
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ing, can never replace and should not override existing endorsement test 
factors.  But, other than their new focus on Congress‘s dilemma and the dis-
respect expressed by removal, Kennedy‘s and Alito‘s endorsement analysis 
was limited to the altered perceptions resulting from the change in land 
ownership.  At least in this convoluted case, there is one possible legitimate 
explanation for the omission.  The holding that a display of the cross on 
federal land violated the endorsement test had res judicata effect,89 so the 
Courts‘ opinions focused on the propriety of the government‘s legislative 
remedy.  Justice Kennedy (and Chief Justice Roberts), at least, left a more 
complete analysis of the endorsement principles to the district court on re-
mand.90 
Regardless of rationale, neglecting the perspective of offended viewers 
and outsiders is no minor point.  Several Buono amici explained that, for 
them, every cross symbolizes the salvation of believers and the damnation 
of non-Christians,91 and this is also the viewpoint of some Christians.  The 
Court‘s failure to express empathy for the non-Christian perspective and 
corresponding focus on nailing down an irrefutable argument for its own 
position are all-too-common features of judicial opinion writing, particular-
ly in religion cases.  Since Establishment Clause opinions frequently must 
resolve irreducible values conflicts, empathizing with and expressly ac-
knowledging the other side‘s painful losses should be integral to judicial 
decision-making.92 
Given these circumstances, would there be any value added by the ex-
panded endorsement test suggested by Kennedy‘s and Alito‘s Buono opi-
nions?  That depends on both its outer limits and on the available options.  
Justice Kennedy announced in Buono that ―[t]he goal of avoiding govern-
mental endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in 
the public realm.‖93  Six Justices are likely to resist ripping out longstanding 
religious statuary from public squares,94 so, which test is used may have a 
considerable effect.  As noted above, commentators have speculated that a 
majority of the Roberts Court will adopt the inflexible historical approach,95 





  Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1815 (2010) (Buono). 
90
  See id. at 1820–21 (plurality opinion). 
91
  E.g., Brief of the American Muslim Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Council, and the Muslim 
American Veterans Ass‘n, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 9–14, Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 
(No. 08-472) (link). 
92
  Cf. Lisa Shaw Roy, History, Transparency, and the Establishment Clause: A Proposal for 
Reform, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 683, 717 (2008) (suggesting that, in Establishment Clause cases, in-
creased transparency, including more candid explanations of assumptions and acknowledgment of 
weaknesses in hard choices, could increase perceived legitimacy and soften resistance to decisions on 
controversial church-state issues) (link). 
93
  Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1818 (dicta). 
94
  These six, of course, include the five Justices who made up the Buono plurality and concurrences, 
and Justice Breyer, the controlling concurrence in Van Orden. 
95
  See sources discussed supra at note 27. 
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ments to do what ―we‖ have always done.  The endorsement test asks the 
right question because it expresses the constitutional ideal of government 
neutrality in religious matters.96  There is real value—expressivist, as well 
as functional—in retaining the endorsement test‘s viewer-centered inquiry.97 
Thus, rather than perpetuating two opposing camps, there may be some 
persuasive, consensus-building benefit to characterizing the Kennedy/Alito 
Buono approach as part of an ―endorsement test continuum.‖  At least 
where the government‘s options regarding historical-religious speech are 
publicized and widely-known, perhaps such facts could be counted among 
the varied contextual factors considered part of the reasonable observer‘s 
knowledge.  A synthesis of the historical approach and the endorsement 
test—if done well—shows some promise because it is still responsive to 
viewers‘ reactions and cultural change.98  After all, any iteration of the en-
dorsement test, regardless of the type and scope of contextual facts in-
cluded, functions well in practice only with judicial sympathy to its 
underlying equality rationale. 
The endorsement test also takes into account that any given symbol, 
including a cross, can vary in social meaning, depending on factors such as 
its location, its origins, and the historical moment.  When Justice Alito ob-
served that a plain white cross erected by WWI veterans in 1934 symbo-
lized their recent experience at war, while a cross erected now by the 
government in the National Mall would communicate a different message, 
he reflected the essence of the endorsement test.  In another perspective 
from this symposium, Professor Christopher Lund makes the intriguing ar-
gument that a cross always primarily symbolizes the death of Jesus and the 
promise of salvation for Christians, in part because all of its secondary 
meanings are purely derivative.99  While true at some level, this claim is de-
batable because much of current culture has some historical, often Chris-
tian, origin.  Lund‘s claim also does not address recent trends in social 
meaning.  Many viewers‘ interpretations have become increasingly meta-
physical and universalist (e.g., self-giving sacrifice, transformational suffer-





  Cf. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 123–34 (2007) (expressing agreement with Justice O‘Connor‘s endorsement test ratio-
nale and noting similarities between its focus on social meaning and ―the ‗Equal Liberty‘ theory‖) (link). 
97
  For a comprehensive account of expressivist theory, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. 
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000). 
98
  As my Conclusion explains, to be ―done well,‖ the government must take affirmative steps to in-
form the ―reasonable observer,‖ through disclaimers, of facts that support allowing a religious display 
which may raise government endorsement issues. 
99
  See Christopher Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 105 NW. U. 
L. REV. COLLOQUY 60, 64–66 (2010), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/22/LRColl2010n22Lund.pdf (link). 
100
  See, e.g., Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Cross: More Than Religion?, THE IMMANENT FRAME 
(May 5, 2010), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2010/05/05/more-than-religion/ (discussing competing symbolic 
meanings of the cross, which include both universal meanings and specific meanings) (link); see also 
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connections between these interpretations and official, specific religious 
dogma can be quite attenuated.  The fact that some public manifestations of 
iconic symbols are translated by reference to their spatial and temporal con-
text—as contemplated by the endorsement test—does not mean that all re-
ligious meaning is bleached out.  The ―corruption of religion‖ concerns, so 
well-articulated in this symposium by both Professor Lund and Professor 
Ian Bartrum,101 to me seem primarily implicated in other contexts, such as 
where public funding tempts religious organizations to alter their missions. 
CONCLUSION 
This brief discussion has attempted to weave threads from the opinions 
of conservative Justices into a centrist cloth.  Whether this cross between 
the endorsement test and the historical approach was intentional, or simply 
forced by Buono‘s unique circumstances, Justice Kennedy‘s and Justice 
Alito‘s opinions present interesting considerations for pursuing a ―middle 
way.‖102 
To the extent that the reasonable observer is deemed both to appreciate 
the social costs of change and to consider the government‘s accommoda-
tionist motive for preserving a religious-historical symbol, however, the 
government should be given the corresponding duty to make its motives 
clear to observers.  When Justice O‘Connor first characterized the ―reason-
able observer‖ as a hypothetical, objective informed citizen,103 she did so 
based on a concern that every challenged display would offend someone, 
and that only where there is some collective message of endorsement would 
religion be relevant to one‘s standing in the political community.  At the 
same time, however, she declared that the Establishment Clause imposes an 
―affirmative obligation‖ on the government to use adequate disclaimers to 
correct any reasonable misimpressions of religious endorsement caused by 
its own actions.104  The real risk presented by the Buono opinions is that 
lower courts will continue to use the endorsement test, but now will expli-
citly employ an omniscient hypothetical observer whose real sympathies lie 
with the majority and not the excluded. 
                                                                                                                           
CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007) (exploring the lack of boundaries between the ―religious‖ 
and the ―secular‖ in the modern age) (link). 
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  See Ian Bartrum, Salazar v. Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State, 105 NW. U. L. 
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In a forthcoming article analyzing the Establishment Clause impact of 
Pleasant Grove v. Summum, I argue that, because social meaning has 
changed so dramatically over the decades, governments should generally be 
prohibited from displaying new religious monuments and longstanding mo-
numents should be allowed only if accompanied by sufficient government 
disclaimer signs.105  Adequately addressing the concerns raised in Salazar v. 
Buono requires a minimum of two steps.  First, the National Park Service 
should erect signs on nearby Cima Road, visible to all passersby, which ex-
plain not only the VFW‘s new ownership, but also the story of the WWI 
veterans‘ erection of this war memorial in 1934.  And second, the federal 
government must address the unconstitutional appearance of the cross‘s re-
cent National Memorial designation.  This requires (i) clarifying that pre-
serving this cross does not mean that it represents all of the Nation‘s WWI 
war dead, and (ii) communicating that other, non-sectarian monuments also 
play this significant role.106  While less than satisfying to many, this ap-
proach is worth considering.  If done thoughtfully and sensitively, the ―rea-
sonable non-adherent‖ might come to view this particular cross, in this 
desert location, originated in this specific era of history, as a symbol of re-
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